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I. INTRODUCTION 
Do citizens have a right to record the actions of law enforcement 
officers? This topic has been the subject of considerable discussion, and 
no small degree of litigation, in recent years.
1
 The increase in litigation is 
driven by dramatic improvements in camera technology, which allow 
individuals to record and share images in ways that were previously 
available, if at all, only to members of large media organizations.
2
  
Most of the discussion and litigation has revolved around the question 
of whether there is a First Amendment right to record police officers in 
public. In the recent First Circuit case of Glik v. Cunniffe,
3
 for example, 
passerby Simon Glik caught sight of three police officers arresting a young 
man. Hearing a passerby shout that the officers were hurting the man, Glik 
turned on his cell phone and began capturing video. The police officers 
objected to being recorded, arrested Glik and charged him with violating 
the state‘s ―wiretap‖ law by recording them without their consent,4 and 
seized his camera and memory chip in the process as evidence. The First 
Circuit held that the right to record police officers in public is a ―clearly 
established‖ part of the First Amendment‘s protections, and held the 
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.
5
 
 
 
  Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. J.D. (1985), 
Yale Law School; B.A. (1982), University of Tennessee. Thanks to Richard Casada for excellent 
research assistance. 
  J.D. (1996), University of Tennessee. Practicing criminal defense law in Marietta, Georgia at 
John A. Steakley, PC. 
 1. See Morgan Leigh Manning, Less than Picture Perfect: The Legal Relationship between 
Photographers’ Rights and Law Enforcement, 78 TENN. L. REV. 105 (2010) (surveying case law 
regarding the arrest and prosecution of photographers for taking photos and recording video of law 
enforcement officers in public places). 
 2. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Watching The Watchers: Why Surveillance Is A Two-Way 
Street, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/ 
4237005 (describing growth of ubiquitous, low-cost photo and video technology and its impact on 
citizen newsgathering). 
 3. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 4. This is a common, if rarely successful, gambit used by law enforcement to halt or punish 
those recording them. See Reynolds, supra note 2. 
 5. Glik, 655 F.3d at 85–88. 
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Though the issue has not yet reached the Supreme Court, it seems safe 
to say that the case for First Amendment protection regarding photos and 
video of law enforcement officers in public is quite strong, and is in the 
process of being resolved. This Essay, however, argues that independent 
of any First Amendment right, there is also a due process right to record 
the actions of law enforcement, and that this right applies even when the 
interaction takes place in private, and not in public places. This question of 
a due process right to record the police has not yet produced the degree of 
attention and litigation that public recording has, but the growth of 
inexpensive recording equipment and its inclusion in smart phones ensures 
that such attention and litigation are sure to be forthcoming. 
A. The Public-Private Distinction 
It is not entirely clear that the First Amendment right to record police 
officers applies only in public. Just as the ―plain view‖ exception to the 
Fourth Amendment empowers police officers to make arrests based on 
objects or behavior they see in the privacy of citizens‘ homes, it is entirely 
possible that the First Amendment entitles citizens to record police 
officers‘ actions whenever citizens are present. Most of the leading cases 
to date, however, have involved public places, and that has been stressed 
in the opinions and discussion. In Glik, for example, the First Circuit noted 
that the arrest took place in Boston Common, ―the oldest city park in the 
United States and the apotheosis of a public forum. In such traditional 
spaces,‖ the court continued, ―the rights of the state to limit the exercise of 
First Amendment activity are ‗sharply circumscribed.‘‖6 
While citizen journalism may record misconduct—or the lack 
thereof—where police act in public parks and similar locations, the very 
public character of those places means that there will likely be other 
witnesses. But what of the interaction of citizens and police officers in 
places where there is no one else present? 
Such interactions may well be newsworthy enough to justify First 
Amendment protection, but they may also raise due process concerns. 
When officers act improperly in the presence of witnesses, after all, they 
may still enjoy a testimonial advantage, as courts and juries are 
notoriously willing to believe even doubtful police testimony. But when 
there is no third party present, the question is presented more strongly. A 
recent case from Chicago serves to illustrate the point. 
 
 
 6. Id. at 84. 
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Tiawanda Moore made a sexual harassment complaint against a 
Chicago patrol officer. When visited by police Internal Affairs officers 
who tried to persuade her to drop the charge, she recorded the audio using 
her Blackberry. Though the audio reflected rather poorly on the Internal 
Affairs officers, the response of the Chicago state‘s attorney was to act not 
against the officers, but against Ms. Moore, charging her with 
―wiretapping.‖ 
Moore was acquitted after the jury heard the recording: 
Her attorney, Robert W. Johnson, argued that Moore believed that 
the internal affairs investigators, Sgt. Richard Plotke and Officer 
Luis Alejo, were dragging their feet on her complaint, which could 
be construed as official misconduct, a criminal charge. 
―The plan was to kill this complaint from the very beginning,‖ 
Johnson told jurors Wednesday in his closing argument. ―They were 
stalling, they were intimidating her and they were bullying her into 
not making that complaint.‖ 
In the recording, which the one juror said was replayed several 
times in the jury room, Alejo was heard explaining to Moore that 
she might be wasting her time because it was basically her word 
against that of the patrol officer. Alejo also said they could ―almost 
guarantee‖ that the officer would never bother her again if she 
dropped the complaint. 
―When we heard that, everyone (on the jury) just shook their head,‖ 
juror Adams said in a telephone interview. ―If what those two 
investigators were doing wasn't criminal, we felt it bordered on 
criminal, and she had the right to record it.‖ 
Moore alleged that the patrol officer who answered the domestic 
disturbance call at her home had fondled her and given her his 
personal phone number.
7
 
 
 
 7. Jason Meisner & Ryan Haggerty, Woman Who Recorded Cops Acquitted of Felony 
Eavesdropping Charges, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-25/ 
news/ct-met-eavesdropping-trial-0825-20110825_1_eavesdropping-law-police-officers-law-enforcement. 
For a more recent instance where private recording played a similar role in protecting an indvidual‘s 
rights, see Douglas Stanglin, Cops In A Jam After Cell Tape Contradicts Arrest Report, USA TODAY 
ONDEADLINE BLOG, Mar. 28, 2012, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ ondeadline/post/2012/03/ 
cops-in-a-jam-after-cell-tape-contradicts-arrest-report--/1 (―The audiotape depicts a starkly different 
scene from what officers Nicole Stasnek and Derek Fernandes declared in their official reports and 
told the court under oath.‖). 
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Moore, when the Internal Affairs officers spoke with her, was not 
under investigation—she was the complainant, whom investigators were 
trying to persuade to drop the complaint they were supposed to be 
investigating. But, there seems no good reason why she should have been 
prosecuted for recording this interaction, and it seems quite likely that a 
jury would not have believed her testimony about the Internal Affairs 
officers‘ behavior, which was indeed almost ―incredible,‖ without such 
evidence. 
B. Legal Self-Defense 
Of course, for citizens speaking with federal investigators, a possible 
False Statements Act prosecution makes self-defensive recording even 
more important. Under the False Statements Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001, 
. . . [W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the 
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the 
United States, knowingly and willfully—  
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a 
material fact;  
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or  
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same 
to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
entry;  
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, 
if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as 
defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or 
both.
8
 
In the absence of a recording, it is the citizen's word against the 
investigators‘ regarding precisely what is said, and although the due 
process clause might not extend so far as requiring that investigators make 
 
 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In recent years, numerous high-profile defendants, though found innocent 
of the crimes of which they were initially accused, were nonetheless convicted of violating the False 
Statement Act. See Solomon Wisenberg, How to Avoid Going to Jail under 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 for 
Lying to Government Agents, FINDLAW.COM, http://library.findlaw.com/2004/May/11/147945.html 
(describing such cases and concluding that ―[t]he potential for abuse of this statute is great‖) (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/6
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a recording of their conversations, it certainly seems that it might extend 
so far as to permit citizens to do so. 
So for citizens, recording interactions with police serves two important 
purposes regardless of whether those interactions take place in public or in 
private. First, it provides a record of potential police misbehavior. Second, 
it provides a potentially exculpatory record of the citizen‘s conduct, in 
circumstances where, otherwise, it would be the citizen‘s word against the 
officer‘s. These are the sort of interests implicated by the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, although citizens‘ 
right to record the police is usually analyzed under the First Amendment, 
this Essay argues that there may be compelling reasons to analyze that 
right under the due process clause as well. 
II. DUE PROCESS AND EVIDENCE 
At present, perhaps because ubiquitous audio and video recording 
technology is a very recent development, there is little, if any, case law on 
point. However, a due process right to record the police would represent a 
logical step beyond existing law that deals with law enforcement's duty to 
preserve potentially exculpatory evidence for the benefit of criminal 
defendants. Such duties on the part of law enforcement are limited by the 
burden that such evidence preservation might pose, but that burden is not 
present where the evidence in question is gathered and preserved by 
individuals. In such cases, law enforcement officers need simply do 
nothing. Their only ―burden‖ would consist of a duty not to interfere. 
A. The Duty to Preserve Evidence 
At present, police and prosecutors have a duty to turn over exculpatory 
evidence to defendants when such evidence exists and when they are 
aware of it.
9
 However, they are under no duty to preserve such evidence in 
general, and absent bad faith, the destruction of such evidence is not a 
violation of due process rights.
10
 
This reading of due process has been criticized by commentators who 
note that such evidence may constitute an accused's only real hope for 
acquittal, and that the difficulties involved in proving bad faith on the part 
 
 
 9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 10. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). See also Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad 
Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 241 (2008). 
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of law enforcement are almost insuperable for most defendants, resulting 
in proceedings that are substantively unfair.
11
 But notwithstanding such 
criticisms, federal courts—and many state courts—have generally been 
reluctant to impose a duty to preserve evidence, worrying that such a duty 
would be a tremendous burden on prosecutors and law enforcement 
agencies.
12
 As the Supreme Court stated in Arizona v. Youngblood, ―[The] 
‗fundamental fairness‘ requirement of the Due Process Clause [should not 
be read] . . . as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute 
duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable 
evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.‖13 The Court thus 
settled on the ―bad faith‖ test as a bright-line approach, one that would 
focus judicial attention on those cases where the police had misbehaved, 
and where that misbehavior itself served as an indication that the 
destroyed evidence had exculpatory significance. 
Regardless of the merits of the bright-line approach, which has been 
rejected in some states as a matter of state constitutional law, it is easy to 
understand the Youngblood majority‘s concern: police evidence rooms are 
not unlimited in size, and if the disposal of any item might at some later 
date wind up deep-sixing a case, the natural tendency to hang on to every 
item would soon lead to an overflow, and problems with storage and 
indexing of evidence that might themselves lead to additional problems 
and injustices, as well as expense. None of these concerns, however, 
applies in the context of a private citizen recording interactions with the 
police. 
B. A Right to Record 
Unlike a duty to preserve evidence, a right to record interactions with 
the police imposes no burdens on the police at all. Where someone else 
does the recording, the police are being asked not to act, but to refrain 
from acting. Given that photography and recording are activities to which 
a liberty interest attaches,
14
 this difference makes a due process right to 
record the police rather easy to analyze under the Supreme Court‘s 
standard framework as presented in Mathews v. Eldridge.
15
 
 
 
 11. Bay, supra note 10. 
 12. Id. at 255. 
 13. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, quoted in Bay, supra note 10. 
 14. Glik, 655 F.3d at 87–88. 
 15. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
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In Eldridge, the Court held:  
 [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used; and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government‘s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.
16
 
In the context of recording the police, the analysis is straightforward. 
First, the private interest here is considerable. For a citizen, every 
interaction with the police is significant. Statements they make may give 
rise to criminal liability, and the police may even use force—perhaps 
including deadly force—as part of that encounter. An arrest as the result of 
comments made (or of refusal to answer questions), even if charges are 
later dropped, may lead to a significant deprivation of liberty that is 
unlikely to be compensated. 
Exacerbating this problem is that any conflict between the individual‘s 
recollection of events and the recollection of the police is likely to be 
resolved in favor of the police, and in many circumstances, there may not 
be independent witnesses who might resolve the question. Thus, in the 
absence of such a recording, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty 
would seem quite high. 
A recording of the interaction, meanwhile, would seem to reduce 
substantially the risk of error, both by providing a record and by 
encouraging better behavior on the part of the police. (It seems unlikely, 
for example, that Tiawanda Moore would have experienced the same 
treatment had the officers known, or even simply feared, that they were 
being recorded.)
17
 Likewise, the burden on the the government here is 
negligible, since it is being asked merely to refrain from interfering with 
citizens‘ activities. 
Finally, the government‘s interest would seem to align with the right of 
individuals to record police behavior. Individual police officers, and their 
representative police unions, have obvious reasons for preferring that 
 
 
 16. Id. at 335. 
 17. Though it is beyond the scope of this brief Commentary, it is worth noting that such a right 
might also find penumbral support in the Sixth Amendment‘s right to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in a defendant‘s favor. (Thanks to Prof. Brannon Denning for this observation). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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citizens not record their encounters with law enforcement. But, from the 
perspective of the government, which is concerned with justice and right 
outcomes, more information, and more reliable information, is surely a 
plus, rather than a minus. There might be concerns with the accuracy of 
recordings, or with selective editing, but the rules of evidence should 
provide adequate protections on this front, just as they do now with 
security camera footage or police dash-camera video. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In an age of ubiquitous recording, citizens have already learned to 
expect that virtually anything they do outside of their home may be 
recorded by someone. Yet those recordings are usually controlled by 
others who have no obligation to retain them in order to protect citizens‘ 
rights. Under these circumstances, a due process right of citizens to record 
their encounters with law enforcement (and, perhaps, other government 
officials) serves to level the playing field and to protect important liberty 
interests that may not always be fully protected by the First Amendment.
18
 
At the same time, this due process right imposes no significant burdens on 
government officials or on the public fisc. This being the case, there seems 
no reason why courts should not find a due process right to record the 
police, and many reasons why such a right should exist. 
 
 
 18. There is a tendency on the part of some judges to construe First Amendment protections as 
involving protection for the ―institutional press,‖ rather than protection for all citizens engaged in 
publication or newsgathering. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or 
for the Press as a Technology? From The Framing to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459 (2011) 
(criticizing this view); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, “Open Internet” Proposals and Internet 
Activities By Ordinary Americans, testimony delivered before the Federal Communications 
Commission, Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/19398968/Reynolds-FCC-
Statement-On-Open-Internet (also criticizing this view). 
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